ARTİCLES 3

Disaster and Crisis Management in Turkey: A Need for a Unified Crisis Management System

• April 2010
• Disaster Prevention and Management 19(2):155-174

DOI:10.1108/09653561011037977

• Project: Crises management

• Abstract

  Purpose – Crisis management has gained importance in the policy agendas of many countries around the world due to the increases in the number of natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Thus, this paper has two purposes. The first is to illustrate how the Turkish Government's Disaster and Crisis Management System has been developed. The second purpose is to make a qualitative evaluation of the current disaster and crisis management systems. Design/methodology/approach – Literature review shows that the disaster and crisis management system in Turkey has been developed after tragic events. The paper examines what kinds of initiatives were introduced and what is the trend in shift. After analyzing recent cases and exploring some government initiatives, alternative approaches and suggestions were included. Findings – Turkey has developed its disaster and crisis management system since 1930, which mostly depended on experiences. The current disaster and crisis management system is governed by a centralized structure which is the responsibility of different ministries. Nonetheless, the system is very weak at local level. Furthermore, participation of non-profit organizations is very limited at both national and local levels. Thus, coordination and management of first-response operations during crises are problematic and ineffective. Particularly, the system is not designed for different types of crises such as terrorist attacks. Practical implications – Crisis management in Turkey needs a more unified and flexible structure to deal with current problems effectively. Further suggestions for better implication are also provided Originality/value – The effectiveness of the disaster and crisis management system is analyzed in natural and man-made disasters. Findings show that centralized and decentralized systems have different functions in different situations.

  

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  Disaster and crisis management
  in Turkey: a need for a unified
  crisis management system
  Ali Unlu
  Department of Public Affairs, University of Central Florida, Orlando,
  Florida, USA
  Naim Kapucu
  Department of Public Administration, University of Central Florida, Orlando,
  Florida, USA, and
  Bahadir Sahin
  Department of Public Affairs, University of Central Florida, Orlando,
  Florida, USA
  Abstract
  Purpose – Crisis management has gained importance in the policy agendas of many countries
  around the world due to the increases in the number of natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Thus,
  this paper has two purposes. The first is to illustrate how the Turkish Government’s Disaster and
  Crisis Management System has been developed. The second purpose is to make a qualitative
  evaluation of the current disaster and crisis management systems.
  Design/methodology/approach – Literature review shows that the disaster and crisis
  management system in Turkey has been developed after tragic events. The paper examines what
  kinds of initiatives were introduced and what is the trend in shift. After analyzing recent cases and
  exploring some government initiatives, alternative approaches and suggestions were included.
  Findings – Turkey has developed its disaster and crisis management system since 1930, which
  mostly depended on experiences. The current disaster and crisis management system is governed by a
  centralized structure which is the responsibility of different ministries. Nonetheless, the system is very
  weak at local level. Furthermore, participation of non-profit organizations is very limited at both
  national and local levels. Thus, coordination and management of first-response operations during
  crises are problematic and ineffective. Particularly, the system is not designed for different types of
  crises such as terrorist attacks.
  Practical implications – Crisis management in Turkey needs a more unified and flexible structure
  to deal with current problems effectively. Further suggestions for better implication are also provided
  Originality/value – The effectiveness of the disaster and crisis management system is analyzed in
  natural and man-made disasters. Findings show that centralized and decentralized systems have
  different functions in different situations.
  Keywords Disasters, Emergency measures, Turkey, Terrorism, Earthquakes, Government policy
  Paper type Conceptual paper
  Introduction
  Crisis management has been gaining a priority in policy agendas of many countries.
  An increase in the number of man-made disasters and natural disasters has led
  governments to invest more in crisis management systems (Tamer, 2004a). The failure
  of crisis management results in tragic consequences; significant property damage and
  The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at
  www.emeraldinsight.com/0965-3562.htm
  Disaster and
  crisis
  management
  155
  Disaster Prevention and Management
  Vol. 19 No. 2, 2010
  pp. 155-174
  qEmerald Group Publishing Limited
  0965-3562
  DOI 10.1108/09653561011037977
  human loss. Since there is no best crisis management system that fits all countries,
  research and experience guide experts to look for solutions to strengthen government
  capability to handle crises. Turkey is one of those countries that frequently experiences
  different crises such as natural disasters, terrorist attacks, and immigration caused by
  war and instabilities from neighboring countries. The frequent occurrences of crises
  result in inefficient use of resources. This also creates political pressure on public
  administrators. Experience shows that consequences of similar crises were greater in
  Turkey in terms of number of deaths and total cost of damage than those in developed
  counties.
  Most of the crises have revealed the truth that the Turkish government’s response is
  more reactionary than pre-planned. The government plans for handling crises were
  usually enacted immediately after crises. For instance, the government’s first crisis
  policy was shaped in the 1930s after the Erzincan earthquake. This policy has been
  revised many times but only after natural disasters in order to meet people’s changing
  expectations (Kapucu and Van Wart, 2006). Similarly, the latest regulations are based on
  the 1999 Marmara Earthquake experience. The Turkish Crisis Management System is
  not flexible enough to be applicable to all possible crises. Terrorist attacks in Istanbul in
  2003 revealed that the government still suffers from lack of a well-structured crisis
  management system that can be applied to terrorist attacks as well. The current
  government response system relies on mandating responsibilities to state agencies with
  legal regulations. The government establishes special institutions for emergencies.
  However, those regulations are not as effective as desired ( JICA, 2004).
  In this study, the crisis management policy of the Turkish government will be
  analyzed based on administrative structure and experiences. The crisis management
  statutes, newspaper news reports, and scholarly articles will provide data for research.
  The descriptive analysis of this study contributes to understanding of how the Turkish
  Government developed a crisis management plan and what the motivations for the
  changes were. The following research questions will be examined in the paper: how
  was a crisis management system evolved in response to crises? How does the
  centralized nature of the state crisis management system affect the effectiveness of
  crisis management and response operations? Is the current system effective in
  responding to and recovery from crises and disasters? What are the main organizations
  responsible in managing crises and emergencies? Which policies have been enacted in
  response to certain focusing events? In addition, how do the policies regulate the crisis
  management system in Turkey? This study will contribute to understanding of the
  Turkey crisis and disaster management system. The paper also identifies the main
  problems in the current crisis and disaster management structure of Turkey. The
  formulation of problems will enhance the notion of dealing with crises with the current
  government structure and the kinds of new policies needed.
  Crisis management and the four phases of disaster and crisis management
  Crisis management has been defined from different aspects such as administration,
  recovery and response activities, mitigation efforts or organizational collaboration, for
  example. This study will utilize all administration perspectives as the crisis
  management system. The study will also use the term crisis management for
  emergency management and disaster management. The study will finally propose that
  DPM
  19,2
  156
  a unified all-hazards perspective in managing disasters and emergencies would be
  much more effective than an uncoordinated emergency and crisis management system.
  The crisis management concept consists of rescue, preparedness, mitigation, and
  resilience efforts made by governments, volunteer organizations or other local
  departments (Petak, 1985). The significance of crisis is its unexpectedness and
  uncontrollability which disrupt and/or impede normal operations. The operation time
  includes the efforts before, during, and after a crisis. A crisis may trigger rapid public
  policy changes since it draws public and media attention and threatens public trust
  (Alexander, 2005). “Triggering events” or “focusing events” are strong motivators for
  policy changes. These events happen suddenly and are rarely harmful or potentially more
  harmful in the future. Triggering events become known to policy makers and public
  simultaneously (Birkland, 1997). The nature of these events highlights policy failures
  dramatically, which provides an opportunity for policy learning (Birkland, 2004).
  Even though the aim of the study is not to discuss crisis management theories, it is
  essential to point out what the crisis management system entails. The four phases of
  crisis management will be explained briefly in the following section. This framework
  will help us to explain the systemic issues and problems in the Turkish crisis
  management system. Mitigation is defined by Petak (1985, p. 3) as “deciding what to do
  where a risk to the health, safety, and welfare of society has been determined to exist;
  and implementing a risk reduction program”. The Turkish Government’s mitigation
  plan has been harshly criticized due to its inefficiency (S¸ehir Plancilari Odasi, 2007).
  Mitigation could be far more vital for some underdeveloped countries than for
  developed ones. This is particularly true for Turkey, since Anatolia is one of the most
  earthquake-active regions of the world (Balamir, 2004). However, the 1999 earthquake
  had a significant impact on the government since it sought to transform its approach
  from conventional post-disaster activity and pretensions of preparation for
  emergencies to pre-disaster mitigation regulation. The government has changed its
  role from “State as healer” to “State as protector” (Balamir, 2001).
  Preparedness consists of developing a response plan and training first responders to
  save lives and reduce disaster damage (Petak, 1985). This process generally covers
  technical tasks such as identification of critical resources and the development of
  necessary agreements among responding agencies, which is to be accomplished and
  implemented by the government (Balamir, 2004). It is based on formal government
  responses consisting mostly of documentation, legal and organizational regulations. In
  Turkey, preparedness planning is often undertaken by local administrations as a legal
  obligation. This public responsibility is given to all provincial administrations by
  so-called “Disasters Law,” which describes methods and standards of
  “preparedness-planning” (Balamir, 2004).
  The main goals of the response phase are providing emergency aid and assistance,
  reducing the probability of secondary damage, and minimizing problems for the
  recovery operation (Petak, 1985). It also includes monitoring the dynamics of the
  economy and society for robust and sustainable development and in-built safety. The
  main features of the response planning are long-term structuring of agents and legal
  systems, shaping the cultural background for greater awareness of hazards, and
  improving the capacity of communities in their resilience to improve emergency
  management. The success of multi-task response operations depends on the
  Disaster and
  crisis
  management
  157
  integration of programs prepared in distinct disciplines and coordination of a
  generated synergy (Balamir, 2004).
  Recovery consists of “providing immediate support during the early recovery
  period necessary to return vital life support systems to minimum operation levels, and
  continuing to provide support until the community returns to normal” (Petak, 1985,
  p. 3). It covers a wider range of work including compensations and programs devised
  for social and economic healing operations. The main purpose of the recovery planning
  is to ensure the continuity of the organizations’ operations in the crisis field to stabilize
  the essential functions and systems of the community in the shortest time.
  Nevertheless, many recovery plans face failure because it is a post-crisis event and
  consists of contingency, where no pre-determined principles work and most of the
  work requires ad hoc operations (Sandhu, 2002).
  Disaster policies and regulations in Turkey
  Legislative development will be discussed in the first section of this chapter. Several
  laws were enacted and some of them were superseded during the last 50 years.
  Development of the legislative structure of crisis management will be analyzed with
  the other reasons that forced government to renew laws. Second, mainly responsible
  crisis management organizations will be analyzed in terms of how they are prepared
  for emergencies and how they interact with local and central government organizations
  before, during, and after disasters. This section includes involvement of other
  organizations that have a secondary CM responsibility, and their interactions with
  other organizations. In the third stage, the role of public and non-governmental
  organizations in emergency response will be analyzed with regard to policy framework
  and practice. Finally, overall evaluation of the Turkish Government approach to crisis
  management in response to the 1999 Marmara Earthquake and 2003 Istanbul
  Bombings will be discussed.
  Since earthquakes are the main and most destructive disasters for Turkey, crisis
  management is mostly considered as part of the earthquake response management in
  Turkey. The location of Turkey is in the eastern Mediterranean sector of the
  Alpine-Himalayan earthquake belt. According to the Ministry of Public Works and
  Settlement’s hazard zone map, 71 percent of the population live in the first- and
  second-degree seismic hazard zone. Moreover, 76 percent of the industries and 69
  percent of the dams are also located in high degree seismic zones (Ganapati, 2008). A
  total of 131 earthquakes were recorded as 60 percent of all disasters between 1902 and
  1999 (Ergunay, 1999). More than 20,000 people died in the latest five earthquakes,
  between 1992 and 1999 (Gu
  ¨lkan, 2002). Therefore, the protection of human lives and
  property is on the agenda of government and other public organizations.
  Crises and disaster policy, and legislative development in Turkey
  Legislation is a formal and official way of responding to disasters. Most laws related to
  the disasters were enacted right after disasters in Turkey. While crisis management is
  considered as a part of the response to earthquakes, the form of disaster response
  includes providing food, clothing, health services, and temporary housing during and
  after disasters (see Table I) (Ganapati, 2008; JICA, 2004).
  Pre-1944, “Post-event response period”. In this period, there are no effective and
  systematic crisis management policies and activities. Disaster and crisis management
  DPM
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  158
  Name of the law Year/law number Related ministry/institution
  Protection against surge and flooding
  Law
  1943/4373 Executive body (the cabinet) is
  responsible for implementing the law
  Measures to be put into effect prior to
  and after earthquakes and known as
  foundation of disaster management in
  Turkey
  1944/4623 Ministry of Public Works/Kandilli
  Observatory
  Civil Defense Law 1958/7126 General Directorate of Civil Defence
  (under the Ministry of the Interior)
  Law on Measures and Assistance to
  be Put into Effect regarding Disasters
  Affecting the Life of the General
  Public (Disaster Law)
  1959/7269 Council of Ministers, Ministry of
  Public Works and Settlements,
  Provincial and District Governments
  Law Related to Precautions and Aids
  for Disasters Effect Life in General
  Public
  1968/2479 Ministry of Public Works and
  Settlements
  Law of Turkish Atomic Energy 1982/2690 Prime Ministry/Turkish Atomic
  Energy Agency
  Decree with the Power of Law on
  Organization and Duties of the
  Ministry of Public Works and
  Settlement
  1983/180 Council of Ministers, Ministry of
  Public Works and Settlements
  Extraordinary Situation Law 1983/2935 Council of Ministers
  Law on Organization and Duties of
  the Ministry of Home Affairs
  1985/3152 Ministry of Interior
  Construction/Development Law 1985/3194 Ministry of Public Works and
  Settlements, State Planning
  Organization, Provincial and Local
  Governments
  Regulation on Emergency Response
  Organizations and Planning
  Principles for Disasters
  1988/12777 Chamber of Ministers, Ministry of
  Interior, Ministry of Public Works,
  Turkish General Staff, Related
  Ministries, Turkish Red Crescent
  Regulation on Management of Prime
  Ministry Crisis Center
  1997/8716 Council of Ministers
  Regulations on Additional Items on
  Disaster Effect
  1999/580 Council of Ministers
  Regulations on Disaster Mitigation 1999/582 Council of Ministers
  General Directorate of Turkish
  Emergency Management
  1999/583 and 1999/
  600
  Council of Ministers General
  Directorate of Emergency
  Management (under the auspices of
  the Prime Minister’s office)
  Civil Defense and Municipality Law 1999/586 Council of Ministers
  Decree with Power of Law on the
  Obligatory Earthquake Insurance
  (DASK)
  1999/587 Council of Ministers Natural
  Disasters Insurance Administration
  (Under the auspices of the Treasury)
  Regulations on Residence Funds 1999/588 Council of Ministers
  Regulation on Construction Code
  Enforcement
  1999/595 Council of Ministers
  Regulations on Civil Defence Law 1999/596 Council of Ministers
  Regulations on the Law Related to
  Precautions and Disaster Aid
  1999/597
  1999/598
  1999/599
  Council of Ministers
  (continued)
  Table I.
  Major laws/regulations
  related to disasters and
  responsible ministries in
  Turkey
  Disaster and
  crisis
  management
  159
  was based on a reactive approach and included response and recovery phases in
  contrast with preparedness and mitigation (Ganapati, 2008). Without any
  comprehensive and organizational or technical capacity, government showed limited
  post-crisis efforts. First, a mitigation Law (No. 4373) was enacted for continuous floods
  in early 1943 (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005; JICA, 2004).
  1944-1958, “Feeble countermeasures period”. Devastating earthquakes during
  these years pushed the government to enact legal provision, develop strategies for
  mitigation and plan preparedness activities. Several proactive disaster laws were
  enacted during this period (Ganapati, 2008).The first proactive law was called
  “Measures to be put into effect prior and after earthquakes” and known as the
  foundation of disaster management in Turkey (Law Number 4623). The law required
  identification of seismic risk for Turkey, development of response and relief programs
  in advance, and preparing geophysical examination for new development areas. A year
  later, the Ministry of Public Works issued the first seismic risk map and mandatory
  construction codes for earthquake regions (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005). The
  renewal of seismic recording at the Kandilli Observatory was another stage of progress
  as a requirement of the law. Finally, two new offices, the earthquake branch at the
  office of Construction and Development Affairs and General Directorate of State
  Hydraulic Works, were founded under the Ministry of Public Works (Corbacioglu and
  Kapucu, 2005). Following regulations, “Development Law” (No. 6785) in July 9, 1956
  and the “Civil Defense Law” (Law No. 7126) in 1958 were enacted to improve the crisis
  management system of Turkey.
  The 1958-1999, “Ministry response for disaster and construction period”. The Law
  No. 4623 was enacted in response to earthquakes and did not cover mitigation,
  preparedness, response and recovery activities for other natural disasters such as
  floods, landslides, rock falls and fires. Afterward, the Grand National Assembly passed
  a new law in 1959 (No. 7269) named “Measures and assistance to put into effect
  regarding natural disasters affecting the life of the general public”. It combined all
  legal arrangements related to disasters and established the essence of current
  Name of the law Year/law number Related ministry/institution
  Mandate on Establishment of the
  Independent National Earthquake
  Council
  2000/2000-9 National Earthquake Council
  Law on Building Inspection 2001/4708 Council of Ministers, Ministry of
  Public Works and Settlement,
  Provincial and Local Governments,
  Building Inspection Firms
  Decree on Working Procedures and
  Principles of Natural Disasters
  Insurance Administration
  2001/Official Gazette
  No. 24600
  Natural Disasters Insurance
  Administration (under the auspices of
  the Treasury)
  Law on Municipalities 2004/5272 Council of Ministers, Ministry of
  Interior
  Decree on Design Principles for
  Buildings in Disaster Regions
  2006/Official Gazette
  No. 23098
  Ministry of Public Works and
  Settlements
  Source: Adapted from Ural (2006); Ganapati (2008)
  Table I.
  DPM
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  160
  organization, the principles of operations and the disaster fund outside the state budget
  (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005; JICA, 2004).
  During this period, government took institutional measures in response to natural
  disasters. Many state organizations were established for disaster management
  (Ganapati, 2008). While the law superseded Law No. 6785, it also restructured the
  “Ministry of Public Works and Settlement” ( JICA, 2004). The Ministry was only
  formed as the Ministry of Public Works previously but after the 1958 legislation it was
  improved to involve “Settlements” as well (Ministry of Public Works and Settlement,
  2008). The Ministry was held responsible for coordination and implementation of
  government obligation and “Development Law”. The new law mainly regulated
  land-use, construction, and inspection of buildings.
  Another major change came with Development Law 3194 in 1985, giving the
  principal authority to municipalities for determination of local lands unsuitable for
  development, a system for the evaluation of the existing building stocks, and
  procedures of control over construction (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005). The main
  weakness of the new law was that it was not connected with Disaster Law 7269. Even
  though there were potential links between the two laws for mitigation, development
  and mitigation issues were kept separate in practice (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005).
  The Turkish government also enacted specific laws in response to specific disasters.
  For example, “Measures and assistance to Erzincan, Gumushane, and Tunceli
  earthquake areas” (Law No. 3838) was enacted after the Erzincan Earthquake in 1992.
  This law was replaced with Law No. 4123 after the Dinar Earthquake in 1995 called
  “The services to be performed in relation to damage and disruption caused by natural
  disasters”. The law became effective across the country, although it was enacted for a
  local case. Final revision of the current law came in 1997, called “Crisis management
  regulation by Cabinet Decree” with the inclusion of all natural disasters (JICA, 2004).
  The post-1999, “Awakening period”. The 1999 earthquake was one of the most
  devastating earthquakes in Turkish history. Ten days after the disaster, the Grand
  National Assembly gave special authority to the government with the Law No. 4452
  titled “Decree with the Force of Law” to take whatever measures were judged as
  necessary according to the legal instrument. This special law authorized the
  government to issue decrees in order to be able to solve problems and meet the needs
  for a limited time of three months. This period was extended three times and gave the
  government ten months for stabilization of the region (JICA, 2004). The legislation
  forced the province and district administrators to draft their own emergency plans as
  legal consequences of Disaster Law No. 7396 and Regulation No. 12777; however, these
  plans did not consider the complexity of disaster management (Corbacioglu and
  Kapucu, 2006).
  Significant cases and changes in the disaster and crisis management
  system
  The following section discusses the historical cases impacting the disaster
  management system in Turkey. This section also highlights significant changes in
  disaster policy and management caused by the significant extreme events and
  catastrophic disasters.
  Disaster and
  crisis
  management
  161
  1999 Marmara earthquake
  The Marmara earthquake is the most destructive earthquake in Turkey since 1939,
  killing more than 15,000 people, and leaving over 250,000 people homeless, damaging
  214,000 resident and 30,000 business units, with a total economic cost of more than
  US$16 billion (Steinberg et al., 2004). The Marmara earthquake was a regional
  earthquake heavily affecting Avcilar, (Istanbul), Kocaeli, Sakarya, Yalova and Bolu
  provinces. As a central government unit, the General Directorate of the Civil Defence
  officials arrived at the area at 05:30 a.m., approximately two hours after the
  earthquake. However, without sufficient communication infrastructure and radio
  dispatches on trucks, there was great uncertainty about organization of the rescue
  operations. The lack of correct information prevented the government authorities from
  sending the right type of aid to the correct locations (Gu
  ¨lkan, 2002). When new rescue
  teams arrived, they had no idea where to go, how to start, how to communicate with
  other rescue teams and government officials. Therefore, the first day of the earthquake
  was the least effective day with regard to the whole rescue operations conducted
  specifically for this earthquake (World Bank, 1999).
  The degree of openness of the communication channels was perceived as being poor
  (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2006) and resulted in inefficient coordination among
  first-responders. For example, since there were approximately 2,500 international
  voluntary and non-governmental organizations during the earthquake, most of them
  returned without providing effective aid ( JICA, 2004). Similarly, the information flow
  between medical emergency centers, rescue teams, police, military and volunteers
  hampered timely informed action, especially during the first three days (Corbacioglu
  and Kapucu, 2006). Furthermore, Kizilay (Red Crescent), the Turkish equivalent of the
  Red Cross, came in the area after five days. Therefore the first response of relief and
  rescue was supplied mainly by neighbors, relatives, individuals and other volunteer
  initiatives (Jalali, 2002).
  The tragic consequences of the disaster led the government to implement new
  strategies in the earthquake region. For the first time, the central government
  established a temporary Regional Coordination Governorate to allocate resources in
  the region (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2006). It also coordinated response organizations’
  operations – the Marmara Earthquake has the highest organizational involvement in
  response and recovery operations ever in Turkey (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2006).
  The Marmara earthquake encouraged local administrators to establish their own
  crisis management systems. For instance, the Istanbul Governorship established the
  Governorship and Emergency Coordination Center (AKOM) consisting of
  representatives from different subordinates such as Fire Department, Secretary of
  Defence, Health Directory etc. The AKOM consists of five subdivisions:
  (1) The Central Committee is responsible for decision making in order to overcome
  a crisis as quickly as possible.
  (2) The Execution Committee takes precautions in order to reduce the time of chaos
  to a minimum.
  (3) The Scientific Inquiry Committee makes researches.
  (4) The Directorate is responsible for managerial works such as operational
  processes.
  (5) Finance and management (Akinci, 2004).
  DPM
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  162
  2003 Istanbul bombings
  Two groups of attacks targeted two synagogues, the British Consulate and the HSBC
  Bank’s headquarters in Turkey within ten days in Istanbul in 2003. The first group of
  attacks occurred in the Neve Shalom Synagogue in Kuledibi and in the Beth Israel
  Synagogue in Sisli district at 09:30 a.m. on November 15, 2003 with two simultaneous
  explosions. In both attacks, explosive-laden vans were used in front of the synagogues.
  The second group of attacks happened at the Consulate-General of Great Britain in the
  Beyoglu district and at the Directorate of the HSBC Bank in the Levent district
  simultaneously on November 20, 2003. In both attacks, 53 people lost their lives and a
  total of 718 people were injured (Istanbul Technical University Center of Excellence for
  Disaster Management, 2005).
  According to the findings of the Istanbul Technical University Center of Excellence
  for Disaster Management (2005), the lack of an Incident Command System (ICS) was
  the main obstacle for emergency responders. The incident command system is the
  most basic component of crisis management since it is based on a pre-determined
  management concept. Another reason for the use of ICS is that it is adaptive for
  incident-based responses. In other words, ICS is a mobile management structure that is
  able to change incident by incident. Nevertheless, the current government’s crisis
  management plan is stable, permanent and a great scale-system that aims to organize
  many groups and organizations. This weakness caused inefficient use of resources and
  communication tools among the first responders. Furthermore, the current ICS
  structure did not activate a unified command that regulates operations for the
  identification of the main targets of operations, response strategies, planning and
  coordination of responder organizations. For instance, although the city governors are
  responsible for crisis management in Turkey, they are not well trained, which made
  them non-functioning as a unified command. This caused authority problems, logistics
  support delays and bureaucratic obstacles during the Istanbul bombings crisis in 2003.
  The main problems in crisis management were coordination, communication,
  collaboration, resource management and a unified command system (Istanbul
  Technical University Center of Excellence for Disaster Management, 2005).
  Even though the Istanbul Governorship established the Governorship and
  Emergency Coordination Center (AKOM) in the Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul
  after the Marmara Earthquake, it was not as effective as expected during the crisis.
  The AKOM Center includes many different subordinates such as Head of Fire
  Department, Secretary of Defence, Head of Health Directory but their interactions with
  one another (or with the environment) during the crisis were limited. The Metropolitan
  Municipality of Istanbul coordinated most of the initial responses such as firefighters’
  presence at the scene, closure of emergency roads and transferring traffic, sending
  IGDAS (Natural Gas Company of the Municipality) experts and emergency teams for a
  probable natural gas explosion, and Great Municipality Search and Rescue Teams
  (BAK) (Istanbul Technical University Center of Excellence for Disaster Management,
  2005).
  The Crisis Center of Istanbul Medical Works Directorate responded to the bombings
  effectively and there were no major problems for emergency operations. There were
  ambulances at the scene in three minutes after the events and the Turkish Red Crescent
  had enough blood and FFP (fresh frozen plasma) stock. While Civil Defence teams are
  mainly responsible in big-scale disasters, they reached the incident scene late because
  Disaster and
  crisis
  management
  163
  their headquarters is about 30 miles away from the city centre (Istanbul Technical
  University Center of Excellence for Disaster Management, 2005).
  Finally, the participation of non-profit organizations was apparent – during the
  rescue operations, search and rescue teams of AKA (Search, Rescue Research
  Association), Sisli branch staff of GEA (Search, Rescue and Ecology Association) and
  AKUT (Search and Rescue Association) actively participated in operations (Istanbul
  Technical University Center of Excellence for Disaster Management, 2005)
  Administrative development and reforms in crisis management
  Centralized administrative structure
  The crisis management system of Turkey is highly centralized and strictly
  hierarchical. Particularly before the 1999 earthquake, the disaster and crisis
  management structure was “paternalistic, wherein the state was responsible for
  most phases of disasters” (Ganapati, 2008, p. 282). Any major CM effort requires
  central government intervention. Province and local administrators can recommend to
  the Council of Ministers that an event should be declared a crisis. The Decree on Basic
  Principles Related to Disaster Affecting the Life of the General Public (Official Gazette
  No. 13007) (Afet Isleri Genel Mudurlugu, 2000) gives direction to central government to
  decide on intervention (Ganapati, 2008).
  In any big-scale emergency, the “Central Coordinating Committee for Disaster”
  coordinates and supports response efforts based on “Disaster Law”, which was
  legislated in 1959 ( JICA, 2004). After the restructuring of the Ministry of Public Works
  and Settlement, it became a main figure for pre- and post-disaster management,
  development issues, and building construction (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005).
  The Ministry was also responsible for implementing Disaster Law No. 7269. The
  Ministry enhanced its function with two new departments; the General Directorate of
  Disaster Affairs (GDDA) was established to manage nation-wide disaster in 1965 and
  the Earthquake Research Department was established in 1975 (Ministry of Public
  Works and Settlement, 2008). However, difficulties in coordination of organizations
  and resources in a bureaucratic structure driven by hierarchic coordination leads
  policy makers to shift the responsibility of post-disaster operations from the Ministry
  of Public Works and Settlement to the Prime Ministry in 1996 (Corbacioglu and
  Kapucu, 2005). The GDDA is responsible for providing emergency relief and
  coordination during disasters, taking short- term and long-term measures, making and
  having others make the related preparations, identifying natural disaster-prone areas,
  taking relevant measures to prevent disasters, and identifying measures and principles
  to minimize casualties in disaster-prone areas by cooperation with public organizations
  (JICA, 2004).
  The General Directorate of Civil Defence (GDCD) was established in 1959 with the
  law No. 7126. The law requires the Civil Defence Directorate to effect preparedness for
  rescue and first aid efforts. The Disaster Law No. 7269 and the Disaster Regulation No.
  12777 also set out some other responsibilities for preparedness. This agency was also
  able to hire rescue personnel after the 1992 Erzincan Earthquake (Corbacioglu and
  Kapucu, 2005). The main responsibilities of GDCD is securing the lives and belongings
  of civil people during wars and natural disasters, reducing the damage to the lives and
  belongings of victims during disasters, renewing, repairing and protecting private and
  DPM
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  government institutions that have vital importance and finally building up morale
  among the civilians (JICA, 2004).
  Re-structuring Kandilli Observatory as Kandilli Observatory and Earthquake
  Research Institute was another parallel change to give priority to research for disasters
  in 1984. This Institute was also transformed from the National Education Ministry to
  Bogazici University. The Institute focused on seismic researches with its three new
  departments: Earthquake Engineering, Geodesy, and Geophysics (Corbacioglu and
  Kapucu, 2005).
  The Marmara Earthquake in 1999 was the turning point for Turkish crisis
  management; it showed the weaknesses and inefficiencies of the previous disaster
  policies. The Government took the following steps to enhance the crisis management
  ability. With the Cabinet decisions Nos. 583/1999 and 600/2000, the Turkish
  Emergency Management General Directorate (TEMGD) was founded to coordinate
  public organizations in emergencies. Another stage in progress was to increase the
  number of professional rescue personnel and the emergency centres at the General
  Directorate of Civil Defence (GDCD) by the Cabinet decision No. 586/1999. Based on the
  regulation, the number of search and rescue centres increased from three to 11, modern
  equipment and vehicles were provided, and 120 more rescue personnel were hired
  (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005).
  The Turkish Armed Forces transformed one of its battalions to a search and rescue
  battalion to strengthen its effectiveness in disasters. The foundation of the Natural
  Disasters Search and Rescue Troop by Turkish Ground Forces was another stage in
  progress in army preparedness for the crisis. Turkish Ground Forces provided the new
  organization with modern equipment, helicopters and central coordination centres that
  control five separate teams (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005).
  Currently, the main government organizations responsible for disaster management
  are the Turkish Emergency Management Directorate (TEMGD) of the Prime Ministry,
  the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs (GDDA) of the Ministry of Public Works
  and Settlement, the General Directorates of Civil Defence (GDCD) of the Ministry of the
  Interior, and finally the General Directorate State Hydraulic Works (SHW) under
  Energy Ministry. Decree No. 600 regulates the process by giving more authority and
  responsibility to TEMGD to coordinate post-disaster activities and mitigation efforts.
  Moreover, many other ministries, state agencies and institutions are also responsible as
  a part of the crisis management system. It was designed in “regulation concerning the
  fundamentals of emergency aid organizations and planning associated with disasters”.
  Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center
  The Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center is responsible for nation-wide
  coordination of organizations and resources. It consists of three administrative bodies:
  Crisis Coordination Committee (CCC), Crisis Evaluation and Watch Committee
  (CEWC), and the Secretariat. As shown in Table II, the Prime Minister is responsible
  for decision making for crisis and leading the committee. It works as a smaller version
  of the Ministry Cabinet. In addition to ministries, the National Security Council is also
  represented (Tamer, 2004b).
  The primary responsibilities of the CCC according to Corbacioglu and Kapucu
  (2005) are:
  Disaster and
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  management
  165
  .Receiving information from domestic and international sources, making political
  decisions or changing the National Security documents regarding the crisis.
  .Making decisions for solving crisis-related problems and having them
  implemented.
  .Deciding on the activation of crisis centres in the Turkish armed forces,
  ministries, public agencies, provinces, districts, or in a region.
  .Providing coordination and collaboration among responsible organizations.
  .Recommending the declaration of emergency law, martial law, preparation for
  war, or war.
  .Authorizing Crisis Evaluation and Watch Committee for needed services and
  activities.
  .Carrying out other tasks ordained by the Prime Minister.
  Crisis Evaluation and Watch Committee (CEWC) primarily consists of deputy
  undersecretaries of the member ministries, as shown in Table III.
  CEWC works hierarchically under the Crisis Coordination Committee and
  implements the policies made by the politicians as state bureaucrats. The primary
  responsibilities of CEWC are as follows (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005):
  .Taking the necessary measures and assigning duties after receiving information
  from CCC.
  Chair: Prime Ministry or a State Ministry
  National Defence Ministry Finance Ministry
  Interior Ministry Health Ministry
  National Education Ministry Agriculture and Forestry Ministry
  Transportation Ministry Industry and Trade Ministry
  Labor and Social Security Ministry Environment Ministry
  Energy and Natural Resources Ministry Secretary of National Security
  Foreign Affairs Ministry Public Works and Settlement Ministry
  Source: Bas¸bakanlik Kriz Merkezi (2000)
  Table II.
  Crisis coordination
  committee
  Chair: Prime Ministry Undersecretariat
  National Defence Ministry Und. Finance Ministry Und.
  Interior Ministry Und. Health Ministry Und.
  National Education Ministry Und. Agriculture and Forestry Ministry Und.
  Transportation Und. Industry and Trade Ministry Und.
  Labor and Social Security Ministry Und. Environment Ministry Und.
  Energy and Natural Resources Ministry Und. Red Crescent
  Foreign Affairs Ministry Und. National Security Council
  Public Works and Settlement Und.
  Source: Bas¸bakanlik Kriz Merkezi (2000)
  Table III.
  Crisis evaluation and
  watch committee
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  .Coordination and collaboration responsibilities among Turkish Armed Forces,
  ministries, and other necessary organizations.
  .Reallocating the resources provided by public organizations for service.
  .Implementing and monitoring the implementation of the decisions of Ministers,
  the Cabinet and the Crisis Coordination Committee (CCC).
  .Recommending that the CCC declare emergency law, martial law, preparation for
  war, and war, when needed.
  .Authorizing the Secretariat of Prime Minister Crisis Management Center for
  necessary services.
  Finally, the Prime Ministry Crisis Management Secretariat works as a lower level
  committee for collecting and distributing information, preparing alternative solutions
  for the crisis, coordinating and managing related domestic crisis centres, and serving
  for coordination and collaboration between Turkey and the crisis management centres
  of the international organizations of which Turkey or another party is a member. Its
  members are senior level bureaucrats and personnel from ministries, public agencies,
  and the Turkish Armed Forces (Tamer, 2004a, b; Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005).
  The central crisis management of Turkey has a similar structure to the previously
  used but uneffective Natural Disasters Coordination Council and Disaster Central
  Coordination Council in the past. The main difference is shifting the leadership role
  from Public Works and Settlement Ministry (PWSM) to the Prime Ministry. Parallel
  with this, the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs was replaced with the Office of
  Prime Ministry Deputy Undersecretary for performing the secretariat services.
  However, the linearity of the system keeps its character as a command and control
  approach through a more hierarchical power-solution (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005).
  Administrative structure of local governments in managing crises
  Only central government representatives, the Governor and the locally elected District
  Mayor are authorized to give a response to a crisis at province level by law. The
  Ministry of the Interior regulates certain responsibilities of elected mayors and
  appointed governors for crisis management (Ural et al., 2003). Particularly during the
  emergency response and rescue phase, both provincial governors and district heads
  have extraordinary powers that could be exercised within 15 days of the disaster (1988
  Decree on Emergency Assistance Organization and Planning Related to Disasters –
  No. 88/12,777). This granted power gives authority:
  .to mobilize and assign tasks to men between the age of 18 and 65 (except military
  officers and judges);
  .to confiscate public and private land, building, vehicles (including live animals),
  equipment, or any other public needs (e.g. food, medicine, clothes); and
  .to utilize necessary equipment for emergency communication and mobilization
  of emergency assistance, such as phones, radios, and TV stations (Ganapati,
  2008, p. 303).
  While provincial administrators are fully responsible and liable, they have no authority
  to intervene in the development process without an ongoing crisis management effort.
  Disaster and
  crisis
  management
  167
  It is due to inefficient implementation of the laws and the national plan at the local
  level, and lack of enough local resources for better preparedness (JICA, 2004).
  The Office of Mayor has all the powers of monitoring, planning and construction
  activities but they fail to implement the technical requirements of disaster management
  (JICA, 2004). Thus, earthquakes have a greater impact on cities than expected. Mayors
  also have authority over fire departments because in all cities fire departments work
  under the Mayor’s authority. Moreover, the current tendency of the Turkish
  government is to extend the responsibilities and authority of local administrators for
  crisis preparation and mitigation duties. This policy change after the 1999 earthquake
  led local governments to strengthen their fire departments, and to support the
  foundation of volunteer search and rescue teams. The participation of local volunteers
  in local crisis management policy has been encouraged; the General Directorate of
  Disaster Affairs issued a regulation to register them to its local offices in 2000
  (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005).
  Provincial and district crisis management centres are responsible for coordinating
  organizations and resources before and after crises. The rescue and aid committee in
  these centres is supposed to be prepared for disasters because it is mandated by law
  (Ganapati, 2008). Valis (governors) head the committee in the provinces and
  Kaymakams head in the districts. The committee acts as a local crisis management
  centre if crisis management is declared. Members of this committee are listed in
  Table IV. There are also regional crisis management centres that work under the Prime
  Ministry Management Centre and they coordinate response and recovery operations in
  more than one disaster site as a requirement of Regulation 96/8716 (Corbacioglu and
  Kapucu, 2005).
  Non-profit organizations and civil society in crisis management
  The Turkish Red Crescent Society (TRCS) is one of the main and non-governmental
  organizations of disaster management structures of Turkey established in 1868. It has
  national, provincial, district level committees, and it actively operates in the disaster
  areas. TRCS also provides blood transfusion services, AIDS and first aid trainings, and
  disaster preparedness training as preparedness efforts. A well-equipped Disaster
  Operation Centre (AFOM) was also established in Ankara (Kizilay, 2008).
  Chairman Governor of the Province
  Mayor
  Commander of Gendarmerie
  Directors Police
  Civil Defence
  National Education
  Public Works and Settlements
  Health
  Agriculture and Rural Affairs
  Energy and Natural Resources
  Local Representative of the TRCS
  Local Military Commander
  Source: JICA (2004)
  Table IV.
  Provincial Rescue and
  Aid Committee
  DPM
  19,2
  168
  The development of non-profit organizations in disaster response was another
  milestone for Turkish Disaster Crisis Management. Before the 1999 earthquake, the
  role of private firms and non-profit organizations was underestimated. The Turkish
  government has moved away from a traditional “paternalistic” approach and has
  reallocated responsibilities. Local governments had held construction inspection but
  after the 1999 earthquake central government believed that they had failed to inspect
  constructions (Ganapati, 2008). This responsibility was given to private Building
  Inspection Firms (BIFs) (Law on Building Inspection, No. 4708 2000: Decree on
  Procedures and Principles for Construction Inspection, No. 24491 2001).
  Another initiative after the 1999 earthquake was the establishment of an independent
  organization called the National Earthquake Council. It consists of scientists from
  different fields such as earth scientists, structural and earthquake engineers,
  environmental engineers, architects, urban planners and psychologists. The goal of
  the council is to identify priority research areas for disaster mitigation in the country.
  Although the Council has no enforcement power, it proposed strategies for better
  mitigation. The first report published was “National Earthquake Mitigation Strategy” in
  2002. Nevertheless, the Council is not as effective as expected (Ganapati, 2008).
  The establishment of National Disasters Insurance Administration (under the
  Treasury) was another important improvement in the disaster and crisis management
  system after the 1999 earthquake. The administration is headed by seven Executive
  Board members from the public and private sectors such as insurance and finance
  organizations. The organization collects the mandatory earthquake insurance from
  homeowners for the Turkish Catastrophe Insurance Pool (Ganapati, 2008). The
  organization provides services by outsourcing activities; for instance policy
  distribution and marketing is held by 24 insurance companies and their agencies
  (Ganapati, 2008). One of the weaknesses of the insurance pool is that it is limited to
  earthquakes. It does not cover other disasters such as floods, landslides or avalanches
  (Ganapati, 2008).
  The non-profit organizations’ role in disaster preparedness and life-saving efforts
  during the emergency response and rescue period led government to regulate their
  existence in the disaster and crisis management system (Ganapati, 2008). The Ministry
  of Interior regulated how non-government organizations are involved in the system
  after 2000 (Ministry of Interior’s Directive on Conditions of participation of Volunteers
  in Civil Defense Service 2000). The Turkish Radio Amateur Club (TRAC) was founded
  in 1962 to provide post-disaster communication services. TRAC facilitates
  communication during the crisis and makes agreements with national organizations
  that are responsible for crisis management: some cities, Mayors and fire departments,
  and health departments as well. TRAC has an office in each province in Turkey and
  coordinates local relationships (TRAC, 2008). AKUT was also the first volunteer search
  and rescue organization after 1995. It became the leading model for many volunteer
  search and rescue organizations (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005). AKUT has nine
  regional offices and increasingly gets public support through volunteer participation
  and fund- raising activities (AKUT, 2008).
  Discussions
  The Turkish Crisis Management System depends on the integration and active
  participation of a large number of ministries and other organizations. Nevertheless,
  Disaster and
  crisis
  management
  169
  there is no mechanism or instrument to force those institutions to work collaboratively
  (JICA, 2004). Furthermore, the duplication and overlapping of authorities in crisis
  management system intensify the problem. The main problem of crisis management in
  Turkey is that there is a coordination problem among ministries and state
  organizations; therefore, a higher authority is necessary ( JICA, 2004). The lack of
  inter-organizational and inter-jurisdictional relations is a main obstacle for mitigation
  and preparation efforts against disasters. The lack of adequate coordination between
  central authorities and the provincial administrations is also evident ( JICA, 2004).
  Developing linear and hierarchical plans and procedures most likely fail to implement
  government strategies and policies effectively during crises (Corbacioglu and Kapucu,
  2005).
  The formal and linear policies ignore the complexity and chaotic conditions of the
  disasters; therefore, insufficient coordination across multiple organizations from
  different jurisdiction and sectors results in the failure of coordination and collective
  actions during emergencies (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2005). For instance, provincial
  officials are responsible for local crisis management but they may not be familiar with
  local situations. Working from the provinces means administrators spending more
  time with other pressing priorities ( JICA, 2004).
  The characteristics of the Turkish Government Disaster and Crisis Policy focus on
  the post-disaster period (response and recovery stage) rather than risk analysis, risk
  mitigation or risk-spreading approaches ( JICA, 2004). However, the 1999 Earthquake
  showed that, if such an earthquake hit Istanbul, the scale of human and physical
  destruction would be worse ( JICA, 2004). Nevertheless, current populist policies
  facilitate illegal settlements into metropolitan areas. To strength the mitigation plan in
  terms of urban planning, the Development Law and the Disaster Law should be
  considered to be two sides of a single coin (Celik, 2006). A legislative precaution is
  inevitable in setting up a strong crisis management system in Turkey, because little
  will be accomplished without legislation. More importantly, it needs to be supported by
  technical provision (Bakir, 2004) and financial assistance (JICA, 2004). Passing laws,
  regulations, and establishing government agencies alone do not produce the desired
  results because crisis management organizations also need financial backing to fulfil
  their mandates (JICA, 2004). Local administrations may be strengthened to make
  rational decisions over land use, particularly, supervision of constructions.
  Lack of political support and local resources is the greatest problem in activating an
  effective crisis management system. Nevertheless, “Healing the wounds” is the basic
  principle in response to disasters ( JICA, 2004). Furthermore, failure in the recovery
  stage of the crisis management efforts in Turkey results in reoccurrence of the same
  problems in the same places at different times. For instance, flood and landslide in the
  East Black Sea Region happened in 1990, 1998, 2001 and 2002 and for the West Black
  Sea region it happened in 1985, 1991 and 1998 (Jeoloji Mu
  ¨hendisleri Odası, 2006).
  Another weakness of the national plan is the assumption that disasters will not
  occur in district centres and resources of the province will be sufficient for response
  and recovery. Nevertheless, several disaster experiences such as the 1992 Erzincan and
  1999 Marmara Earthquakes showed that natural disasters do hit the province centres.
  They required the help of other neighboring provinces, municipalities as well as
  centralized organizations, thereby contradicting the assumption (Corbacioglu and
  Kapucu, 2005). After the 1999 Marmara earthquake, the Ministry of the Interior divided
  DPM
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  the provinces into 100 groups with respect to major disasters. Each province was asked
  to collectively respond to disasters. However, Corbacioglu and Kapucu (2005) argued
  that there was insufficient organizational and technical interprovincial capability
  among public administration organizations in Turkey.
  The difficulties in coordination of crisis management organizations led the
  government to take control of crisis management in one hand. The Prime Minister can
  take control of emergencies by declaring a “Crisis management” situation. A “Crisis
  Center” is activated in the office of the Prime Ministry and the management of crisis is
  directed through crisis centres established in the headquarters of other organizations.
  The crisis is defined as a foreign threat, widespread harmful (terrorist) attack, natural
  disaster, refuge and big immigration movements, epidemics, big fires, chemical and
  technological disasters such as radiation and air pollution, heavy economic crisis, and
  other similar situations.
  The management of crisis consists of different levels of organizations. While the
  Prime Ministry Crisis Management Center makes the decision at the central level, the
  first response comes from local governorships of the provinces and they establish a
  crisis centre to coordinate local and central government efforts. Nevertheless, even
  though it has the responsibility, it does not have the essential authority to command
  and technical capacity to coordinate state bureaucracy during the crisis (Corbacioglu
  and Kapucu, 2005). It also suffers from insufficient human and financial resources to
  undertake its coordinative tasks (Ganapati, 2008).
  The current crisis management policy in Turkey is based on a linear approach,
  which results in a formal government structure that ignores the role of non-profit
  organizations. While the availability of research and rescue teams is still inefficient,
  non-profit organizations can contribute to one of the important duties during an
  emergency (JICA, 2004).
  The hierarchical structure of the crisis management system tends to discourage
  local initiatives and undermines the role of local administrators ( JICA, 2004). Local
  administrators are not effective enough to establish a strong crisis management
  system at the local level. Provincial governors and district heads are not elected
  officials in Turkey. Instead, central government appoints them. They have a turnover
  rate. Therefore, they are not familiar with the local conditions (Ganapati, 2008). In
  addition, the office of the General Directorate of Disaster Affairs that works under the
  umbrella of the Ministry of Public Works and Settlement prepares disaster
  preparedness plans at the local level. Two-headed preparedness constitutes a
  problem because heads of provinces and districts are to affiliated to the Ministry of
  Interior (Ganapati, 2008).
  It fails to pay enough attention to the participation of neighboring provinces and
  municipalities to response operations. The centralized top-down crisis management
  system fails to organize local communities. There is insufficient local investment in
  rescue equipment prior to a crisis (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2006). Furthermore, the
  central government sees coordination as a post-disaster event (Balamir, 1999). The lack
  of inter-organizational collaboration between the central government and
  provincial/district public, private, and non-profit organizations during the response
  and recovery operations is obvious due to difficulties in information sharing
  (Corbacioglu and Kapucu, 2006).
  Disaster and
  crisis
  management
  171
  Conclusion
  New types of crises around the world show that the traditional top-down crisis
  management style does not work effectively. New crises such as terrorist attacks and
  big-scale natural disasters urge governments to plan a crisis management that is more
  effective. Particularly, the September 11 terrorist attacks had a significant impact on
  other countries’ crisis management approaches. The new perspective in crisis
  management requires both linear and non-linear management flexibility. Horizontal
  networks are attracting more attention because it gives governments the opportunity
  to organize both national and local level public organizations, while considering
  non-profit organizations’ participation.
  Turkey, as have many other countries, has modified its crisis management system.
  While the centralized structure of the Turkish Crisis Management System gives the
  government more control over resource allocation and coordination, sharing
  responsibility with different ministries and national organizations creates a
  coordination problem. The requirement for a higher authority is essential for
  coordinating government agencies and other organizations. Currently, the Turkish
  government is working on new legislation to combine all related crisis management
  organizations under one organization that manages all of them effectively.
  Although there is a nation-wide plan for crisis management, it is not applicable to
  all situations and all hazards; for that reason, local initiative gains more attention. More
  resources management and discretion about a crisis management system may improve
  local governments’ performance. The more control local governments have over crisis
  management, the more effective plans will be. Particularly, local volunteers are
  important for disasters and they need frequent contact with government
  representatives for training and planning purposes.
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  About the authors
  Ali Unlu is a research analyst in the Department of Public Administration and a doctoral student
  in Public Affair at the University of Central Florida. His research interests are networks,
  interorganizational networks, collaboration, and interoperability in public organizations.
  Naim Kapucu is an Associate Professor in the Department of Public Administration at the
  University of Central Florida. His main research interests are homeland security and crisis
  management, decision making in complex environment, and organizational learning and design.
  His work has been published in Public Administration Review (PAR), Journal of Public
  Administration Research and Theory (JPART), Administration & Society,American Review of
  Public Administration (ARPA), Public Administration,International Journal of Mass
  Emergencies and Disasters, and Disasters: The Journal of Disaster Studies, Policy, and
  Management. He teaches non-profit management, emergency management and homeland
  security, and analytic techniques for public administration courses. Naim Kapucu is the
  corresponding author and can be contacted at: nkapucu@mail.ucf.edu
  Bahadir Sahin is a research analyst in the Department of Public Administration and a
  doctoral student in Public Affairs at the University of Central Florida. His research interests are
  crisis management, GIS mapping tools, networks and organizational performance.
  DPM
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  174
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